

## The 2024/2025 Croatian Presidential Election

Oliver Kannenberg, Research Associate, Institute for Parliamentary Research (IParl), Berlin  
[kannenberg@iparl.de](mailto:kannenberg@iparl.de)

### Abstract

In some respects, the election campaign for the Croatian presidential election in late 2024 was more of a long-drawn-out ‘coronation ceremony’. The incumbent, Zoran Milanović, was far too popular, and his opponents’ political agendas were not ambitious enough for a surprising result. Milanović’s success in the second round also marked the end of a super election year, which once again highlighted the dominance of two men in Croatian politics.

**Keywords:** Croatia, Elections, President, Personalisation, Populism

### Introduction

The Croatian presidential elections marked the end of Croatia’s super election year 2024. Prior to that, elections to the Croatian parliament, the Sabor, were held in May, closely followed by the elections to the European Parliament in June. Whilst elections in Croatia generally receive relatively little coverage beyond the country’s borders. This time, at least one person drew a fair amount of media attention: the incumbent president, Zoran Milanović. In a multitude of stories, he was given the nickname “Croatian Donald Trump”<sup>1</sup> due to his rather populist demeanour. Despite (or perhaps due to) the negative press coverage, most of which came from international media outlets, Milanović won the presidential election, which was held in two rounds on 29 December 2024 and 12 January 2025, and achieved a landslide victory that should make him all the more powerful in the years to come.

This raises the questions of where Milanović’s popularity stems from, why a pejorative label is by no means a stigma for his person, and how Croatia’s political landscape takes shape after the super-election year of 2024. These and other questions will be addressed below, focusing on the recent presidential elections. For this purpose, I will first explain the political

---

<sup>1</sup> See, among others, Jochechová, Ketrin. 2024. *Croatia set to reelect its ‘Donald Trump’*. *Politico*, 28 December 2024; S Szumski, Charles and Georgi Gotev. 2025. *Croatian elections cheat sheet*. *Euroactive*, 11 January 2025.

context in 2024, then briefly outline the different candidates and their campaigns, and subsequently analyse the election result itself and its possible consequences and implications.

### Three times a vote: The super election year 2024

Since 2015, the conservative Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) has been in power in Croatia under its chairman and, since 2016, acting Prime Minister Andrej Plenković. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections, a series of protests took place in Zagreb and other cities. These were mainly directed at the HDZ's governing style. Accusations of widespread corruption and cronyism are among the omnipresent topics.<sup>2</sup> Since taking office, Plenković has managed to survive a multitude of scandals, unlike some of his involved (ex-)ministers. Just before the election, a much-debated whistleblower law, nicknamed "Lex Andrej Plenković" (or Lex AP) in Croatia, sparked renewed criticism.<sup>3</sup> On top of that, the appointment of the highly controversial Ivan Turudić as Attorney General caused further resentment.<sup>4</sup>

In the midst of this situation, President Milanović announced that he would stand as a parliamentary candidate and SDP (Social Democratic Party of Croatia) candidate for Prime Minister without, however, leaving his office as President. This immediately raised not only numerous legal questions but also (understandably) caused great outrage in the political landscape.<sup>5</sup> Above all, his political opponents from the HDZ repeatedly accused Milanović of violating the constitution. Furthermore, even Možemo, a party that is generally sympathetic to the SDP, voiced strong criticism of this move. As the campaign progressed, news headlines were dominated by verdicts and decisions issued by the Croatian Constitutional Court and the respective responses of Milanović.<sup>6</sup> However, the big coup failed to materialise in the end. Although Milanović repeatedly promised to present a "cunning plan" or advocated for the establishment of a "third republic", he ultimately failed to clearly outline his political agenda, and the electoral campaign gradually lost its momentum.<sup>7</sup> Ultimately, the HDZ emerged once again victorious from the elections.

In the subsequent coalition negotiations, however, the far-right Homeland movement (Domovinski pokret, DP) played the role of the 'kingmaker' and was able to decide (at least in theory) between an alliance with the HDZ or an anti-HDZ, all-party coalition under the leadership of the SDP.<sup>8</sup> From the outset, the latter option was considered rather difficult to realise. Consequently, a coalition was formed between the HDZ and DP. The alliance between the conservatives and a far-right party caused less of a stir in Croatia (and internationally) than one might expect. This was primarily due to two reasons: firstly, the HDZ had managed

<sup>2</sup> Čepo, Dario. 2020. Structural weaknesses and the role of the dominant political party: Democratic backsliding in Croatia since EU accession. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 20(1), 141-159.

<sup>3</sup> Jutarnji list. 2024. Plenković poslao Lex AP na izglasavanje u Sabor, objavljeno tko sve može biti odgovoran. *Jutarnji list*, 29 February 2024.

<sup>4</sup> See on the appointment of Turudić, Tesija, Vuk. 2024. Croatian parliament confirms new attorney general despite opposition criticism. *BalkanInsight*, 7 February 2024. See for both cases, GONG. 2024. Plenković and the parliamentary majority are endangering liberal democracy and the rule of law in Croatia. *Gong.hr*, 7 February 2024.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, GONG. 2024. Gong o Milanovićevoj kandidaturi: HDZ-ove nepravde ne treba ispravljati udarom na politički sustav. *Gong.hr*, 16 March 2024.

<sup>6</sup> Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia. Upozorenje u povodu izjave Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske g. Zorana Milanovića da će se kandidirati na izborima za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor raspisanima odlukom Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske od 15. ožujka 2024 (accessed: 21 May 2024).

<sup>7</sup> See for a detailed analysis of the parliamentary election, Kannenberg, Oliver 2024. Croatia moves to the (Far-)Right. *The Parliamentary Election 2024*. *Southeast Europe in Focus* 6(2), 1-9.


<sup>8</sup> See for a detailed analysis of the Croatian party system, Raos, Višeslav. 2023. Between stale stability and dynamic contestation. *Southeastern Europe* 47(2-3), 238-264.

to capitalise on their years of experience in government during the coalition talks and negotiated an agreement that largely reads just like their own party programme with only a few small concessions towards DP.<sup>9</sup> Secondly, the decision to cooperate with the HDZ was not uncontroversial within Domovinski Pokret itself. An internal power struggle within the party led to the first splits from the DP just a few weeks after the government was formed and led to an even stronger position for Plenković and his party within the government.

The elections to the European Parliament, which took place almost immediately after the formation of the government, were less spectacular. A certain political and electoral fatigue had set in, both among the population, for whom European elections tend to be less important, and among the parties, after the heated election campaign and the relatively protracted coalition negotiations. To counteract this, the newly re-elected Prime Minister Plenković himself stood as the HDZ *Spitzenkandidat* in the election.

In the end, all efforts to mobilise the electorate failed, and the turnout of 21.35 percent was the lowest of all European states. In the previous parliamentary election, 62.31 percent of eligible voters went to the polls, which was the highest turnout since 2015. In contrast to previous EP elections in Croatia, however, the low turnout caused no major surprises this time. On the contrary, the results largely confirmed the previous national election, with only minor losses for Most and Možemo. This meant another electoral victory for the HDZ under Andrej Plenković, which thus emerged strengthened from the first two elections of 2024.

Figure 1: Results of the two recent Sabor and EP elections for selected party lists



Explanation: The Homeland movement was founded after the elections to the European Parliament 2019  
Sources: State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia. *Arhiva Izbora*. (accessed: 04 February 2025)

### **Primus inter pares: The presidential candidates**

In order to be able to stand as a candidate in the presidential elections, a candidate must collect at least 10,000 signatures from eligible voters within a period of twelve days. Voters may only sign for one potential candidate. These rules also apply to the incumbent president

<sup>9</sup> See, Despot, Sanja. 2024. *Andrej Plenković nadigrao DP: Program Vlade skraćena je verzija programa HDZ-a*. *Faktograf.hr*, 17 May 2024.

if he or she seeks re-election. A total of eight candidates managed to submit the necessary number of valid signatures to the electoral commission.<sup>10</sup>

It is hardly surprising that the incumbent president, Zoran Milanović, had little difficulty in obtaining the necessary signatures to run for re-election.<sup>11</sup> His candidacy was primarily supported by 'his' SDP and several smaller parties from the left-liberal party spectrum. The HDZ, its coalition partner DP and other conservative parties endorsed Dragan Primorac. Internationally recognised as a forensic scientist, Primorac served as Minister of Science, Education and Sport under Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (HDZ) from 2003 to 2009. Right from the start, Primorac's nomination was viewed critically, as few believed he had the reputation and qualities necessary to present a serious alternative to Milanović. Although he had political experience and was quite successful in his work as a minister, this experience dates back more than 15 years. Apart from short-lived rumours about a possible candidacy of MEP Davor Ivo Stier, however, no other high-profile candidates emerged, which could be seen as a clear sign that the HDZ considered the likelihood of beating the popular Milanović to be extremely low.

Beyond the two major parties, another two candidates could at least be said to have a (slim) chance of pulling off an outsider victory. The first is Ivana Kekin, a member of parliament nominated by the green-left party, *Možemo! (We can!)*, and the only candidate besides Milanović to appeal to a voter clientele that is decidedly left of the centre. Moreover, she puts a much stronger emphasis on ecological issues and the threats posed by climate change. Secondly, there is the independent candidate Marija Selak Raspudić, who can be assigned to that part of the liberal-conservative camp that is critically minded towards the HDZ under Plenković. Since 2020, Selak Raspudić has been elected to parliament twice as a member of the party *Most*. Following the Sabor election in spring 2024, internal party disputes arose over the composition of the candidate selection for the subsequent elections to the European Parliament. In the wake of these disputes, Selak Raspudić left the party and decided to stand as an independent candidate in the presidential elections.<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand, *Most* supported Miro Bulj, a long-standing Sabor deputy and mayor of the small Dalmatian town of Sinj. The former veteran has repeatedly attracted attention in the past as a vocal critic of the HDZ. Two candidates took political positions on the far-right to extreme-right end of the spectrum. One of them was the lawyer and historian Tomislav Jonjić, supported by the Croatian Party of Rights (*Hrvatska stranka prava, HSP*) and the Croatian Sovereignists (*Hrvatski suverenisti, HS*). Branka Lozo, a professor at the Faculty for Graphic Arts at the University of Zagreb, was the candidate of the *DOMiNO* party (*Dom i Nacionalno Okupljanje, Home and National Rally*), a splinter group of the Homeland movement. She declared the fight against the alleged population replacement as her top priority. Niko Tokić Kartelo, an entrepreneur from Zagreb, stood as an independent candidate in the election, focusing mainly on his accomplishments as a businessman.

---

<sup>10</sup> Two candidates submitted more than 10,000 signatures, but the electoral commission could only authenticate roughly 8,000 signatures for each of them, which meant that neither candidate was allowed to participate in the election.

<sup>11</sup> For a detailed analysis of his previous term as president see, Dimitrijević, Andrej. 2024. [Pregled mandata: Kako je izgledalo pet godina predsjednika Zorana Milanovića](#). *Faktograf.hr*; 27 December 2024.

<sup>12</sup> Ferenčić, Domagoj. 2024. [Selak Raspudić first official candidate for upcoming presidential elections](#). *Glas Hrvatske*, 19 October 2024.

### **Two rounds of the inevitable: Campaign and results**

For a candidate to become president, an absolute majority of all votes cast is required. A run-off vote between the two candidates with the highest number of votes takes place if no one has achieved an absolute majority in the first round. Since 1997, no candidate has managed to obtain an absolute majority in the first round, which is why it is generally assumed that voting will take place in two rounds and the corresponding campaigns are designed accordingly. This was different in the past elections. From the outset, Zoran Milanović had a clear lead in terms of popularity and support, which changed only marginally during the campaign (see Figure 2). One of the reasons for this is Milanović's fundamental ability to appeal to broad groups of voters. His main campaigning issues were:

- Criticism towards the HDZ coupled with combating corruption,
- social justice in the context of rising inflation,
- peace policy and a critical stance towards Croatia's participation in NATO's support and training missions for Ukraine


While the HDZ criticism and the strong advocacy of social justice count among Zoran Milanović's longstanding political issues, his foreign policy position has attracted both national and international attention. Milanović has taken a rather critical line on the unconditional support of Ukraine from the beginning of the war. In concrete terms, this means that although Milanović speaks out clearly in favour of Ukraine, he is particularly critical of the Croatian involvement or support in many areas out of fear of a potential escalation of the war. In this regard, his position differs greatly from that of the HDZ and Andrej Plenković, but it does strike a chord with a number of (quite diverse) voter groups in Croatia. Particularly, this aspect of Milanović's attitude is the reason for his categorisation as a kind of 'Trumpist' in international media.

Simultaneously, he also managed to appeal to and win over sections of the electorate from the far-right using strongly populist rhetoric. Compared to the popularity of the SDP, Zoran Milanović himself is significantly more popular. In this respect, the aim of his campaign was less to win new votes than to make the best possible use of the broad pool of existing voters and, above all, to capitalise on the advantage of incumbency. In the previous elections, Milanović presented himself as somewhat more edgy, and some would say more honest, as "president with character". This time, he used the slogan "Predsjenika za predsjednika" (president for president). The fact that this slogan had already been used by the authoritarian president and HDZ founder Franjo Tuđman in the 1997 presidential elections did not harm Milanović's reputation. On the contrary, the (re)use of this election slogan fits into the electoral strategy of the Milanović campaign<sup>13</sup>, aimed at attracting votes from the political right, without adopting explicitly right-wing views or positions.

---

<sup>13</sup> N1 info. 2024. [Milanović o Draganu Primorcu: "To je Titov pionir i Titov član Saveza komunista. N1 info](#), 26 November 2024.

Figure 2: Selected opinion polls on the presidential election



Opinion polls conducted by 2X1 komunikacije, IPSOS and Promocija plus.

Source: Wikipedia. [2024 Croatian parliamentary election](#) (accessed: 04 February 2025).

Therefore, any attempt by one of the other candidates to run their own campaign was bound to fail in the face of such widespread support for the incumbent, despite plenty of potential sources of criticism and wrongdoings. Dragan Primorac tried to attack Milanović’s policy on Ukraine in particular and promised to strengthen the HDZ’s commitment to the interests of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a traditional HDZ key issue. At the same time, he criticised the (lack of) style in Milanović’s administration and emphasised that his election would restore the necessary dignity to the office.

Both Marija Selak Raspudić and Ivana Kekin tried to capitalise on the fact that they are neither affiliated with the HDZ nor the SDP and actively tried to promote their own candidacies. Although Selak Raspudić, in particular, enjoys comparatively high personal popularity, she was never in a position to challenge Primorac seriously for second place. Although Primorac failed to appeal to a broad cross-section of the electorate, he could still rely on the broad conservative core voter base. The only televised debate with the participation of all candidates before the election did not change the overall dynamics of the campaign, which can be characterised as rather ‘rippling’. Milanović’s large lead in the first round was simply too apparent, meaning that a victory in the second round would be a mere formality.

Despite this predictable development, one could see some surprised faces when the first exit poll results were announced on election night, predicting that Milanović would win the first round with more than 50 percent of the vote. During the course of the evening, they were corrected downwards to 49.68 percent (see Table 1). Around 5,000 votes would have been enough to secure a direct re-election for the president in the first round. Despite the expected defeat, the result of less than 20 percent (19.59) was a resounding disappointment for Dragen Primorac, but also for HDZ leader and Prime Minister Andrej Plenković. After all, Primorac

had the support of the entire ruling coalition as a presidential candidate. Marija Selak Raspudić, with 9.37 percent of the vote, achieved a respectable result in respect of her candidacy as an independent. Ivana Kekin came in just behind her with a clean nine percent of the vote. Although Možemo! had certainly hoped for more support from voters who identify with the centre-left, but have reservations about Milanović as a person, the result confirms the outcome of the last parliamentary elections and is a further sign that Možemo! is becoming an established left-green party in the Croatian party system.

Table 1: Official results of the presidential election 2024/2025

Candidate	Party affiliation	1 <sup>st</sup> round result	2 <sup>nd</sup> round result
Zoran Milanović	Independent (SDP)	797,938 (49.68%)	1,122,859 (74.68%)
Dragan Primorac	Independent (HDZ)	314,663 (19.59%)	380,752 (25.32%)
Marija Selak Raspudić	Independent	150,435 (9.37%)	
Ivana Kekin	Možemo!	144,533 (9.00%)	
Tomislav Jonjić	Independent (HSP)	82,787 (5.15%)	
Miro Bulj	MOST	62,127 (3.87%)	
Branka Lozo	DOMiNO	39,321 (2.45%)	
Niko Tokić Kartelo	Independent	14,409 (0.90%)	
<i>Turnout</i>		46.01%	44.17%

Source: State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia. [\*Konačni rezultati izbora za predsjednika Republike Hrvatske\*](#) (accessed: 4 February 2025).

Thus, as expected, Milanović and Primorac faced each other in the second round of the elections, with the incumbent's lead considered almost insurmountable. Accordingly, the rest of the campaign was rather uneventful, also being interrupted by the turn of the year. Only the direct confrontation between the two opponents in the TV debate, in which the two candidates hurled mutual insults at each other, was an exception and definitely a (questionable) memorable moment in Croatia's recent political history.<sup>14</sup> Ultimately, the last-minute mobilisation attempts by the HDZ failed, and it came to the anticipated landslide victory for Zoran Milanović, who received almost three-quarters of the votes (74.68 percent). This is the highest winning margin in a presidential election since 2000 and contrasts with the close races of the last two elections, where the winner came out on top by only a few tens of thousands of votes (see Table 2).<sup>15</sup>

In the immediate wake of the election, the poisoned atmosphere between the two long-standing opponents Milanović and Plenković was once again evident, turning even supposedly pro-forma matters, such as congratulating the victor, into a political issue. Both Primorac and Plenković persistently refused to congratulate Milanović on his victory. They also announced that they do not intend to attend his inauguration. In their statement to the press, they pointed to Milanović's absence of congratulations in the past parliamentary

<sup>14</sup> The full TV debate is available on the HRT-YouTube channel: Youtube. [\*Predsjednički izbori—drugi krug: sučeljavanje\*](#) (accessed: 18 February 2025).

<sup>15</sup> For analyses of the last two presidential elections, see, Peović, Katarina. 2020. Croatian presidential elections 2019-2020: The anti-corruption myth. *Contemporary Southeastern Europe* 7(1), 1-10; Lalić, Dražen and Marijana Grbeša. 2016. The 2014/2015 Croatian presidential election: Tight and far-reaching victory of the political right. *Contemporary Southeastern Europe* 2(1), 45-54.

elections and his non-attendance as president at the constitutive parliamentary sessions after the 2020 and 2024 elections. At the time of writing, this very special blame game is not yet over.

Table 2: Presidential election results (2<sup>nd</sup> round) in Croatia since 2000

Year	Candidates		Turnout
2000	Stjepan Mesić (HNS) 56.01%	Dražen Budiša (HSLŠ) 43.99%	60.88%
2005	Stjepan Mesić (HNS) 65.93%	Jadranka Kosor (HDZ) 34.07%	51.04%
2010	Ivo Josipović (SDP) 60.62%	Milan Bandić (Independent) 39.74%	50.12%
2015	Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović (HDZ) 50.74%	Ivo Josipović (SDP) 49.26%	59.03%
2020	Zoran Milanović (SPD) 52.66%	Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović (HDZ) 47.34%	54.99%
2025	Zoran Milanović (SPD) 74.68%	Dragan Primorac (Ind./HDZ) 25.32%	44.17%

Source: State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia. *Arhiva izbora* (accessed: 04 February 2025).

### Conclusion and outlook: Two men to rule them all?

With his overwhelming victory in the presidential elections, Zoran Milanović has cemented his position as the second most powerful figure – in political and not constitutional terms – in the country. Whether Milanović’s victory was due to his strength or to the weakness of his opponents is a futile exercise. Milanović’s pre-electoral popularity certainly played a role in the fact that no other viable personnel alternative came forward, particularly from within the HDZ. However, it would be a mistake to interpret this election result as a success for the SDP, a claim that the party's leader, Siniša Hajdaš Dončić, immediately tried to push. In view of the upcoming local elections in May 2024, this might be understandable, but it is nonetheless factually inaccurate. On the contrary, the relationship between and dependence on Milanović and his party is more complicated and probably better seen as both a curse and a blessing.<sup>16</sup> His overwhelming ego, coupled with populist rhetoric and ideological heterogeneity, repeatedly posed a number of challenges for the party, as demonstrated not least by his erratic and uncontrollable behaviour regarding his (non-)candidacy in the parliamentary elections. At the same time, Milanović is more popular than his own party for precisely this combination of personal and policy-related reasons. Therefore, depending on the mood or the ‘political wind’, the SDP could benefit or suffer as a result of Milanović and his personal standing.

In the overall picture for 2024, the different functional logics of elections are clearly evident. While the highly personalised presidential elections benefited the positive aspects of the candidate Milanović, the parliamentary elections were more likely to have an adverse effect. In the Croatian electoral system<sup>17</sup>, which is based on regional party lists, cross-party cooperation, a broad leadership team anchored in the regions and, of course, a substantive claim to political leadership underpinned by a tangible government programme are more important. Needless to say, things would also be easier if the proclaimed Prime minister candidate actually could assume the role in line with the constitution.

<sup>16</sup> On Milanović former role as party president, see, Kukec, Marko. 2020. *Party leaders in Croatia: Comparing Ivo Sanader and Zoran Milanović*, in *Party leaders in Eastern Europe: Personality, behavior and consequences*, edited by Gherghina, Sergiu. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 67-92.

<sup>17</sup> See, Nikić Čakar, Dario and Goran Čular. 2022. Democratic consolidation and electoral system change in Croatia: What is wrong with the proportional representation? *Political Studies Review* 20(4), 546-577.

For the foreseeable future, Croatian politics will continue to revolve around its two main figures and their mutual relationship. Given that Milanović can no longer be re-elected as President, it is reasonable to assume that he will further intensify his criticism of Plenković as his term in office progresses. As for the HDZ, they will continue to try to capitalise on this polarisation and present themselves as a reliable, pro-European force with a stable and reliable voter base. This approach has already allowed the party and its leader to emerge relatively unscathed from numerous corruption scandals in the past. The party has also proven that its capacity for patronage allows it to form all kinds of different coalitions, including minority governments.<sup>18</sup> In the long term, the opposition parties need to develop an effective opposition leadership that is not dependent on Milanović if they want to break the HDZ's dominance.

#### Notes on author

Oliver Kannenberg is a research associate at the Institute for Parliamentary Research (IParl) in Berlin and a PhD Candidate at the Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. His PhD project deals with the institutionalisation of parliaments in Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia. This article was written as part of his visiting fellowship at the Centre for South-East European Studies in Graz.

#### References

- Čepo, Dario. 2020. Structural weaknesses and the role of the dominant political party: Democratic backsliding in Croatia since EU accession. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 20(1), 141-159.
- Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia. Upozorenje u povodu izjave Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske g. Zorana Milanovića da će se kandidirati na izborima za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor raspisanima odlukom Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske od 15. ožujka 2024 (accessed: 21 May 2024).
- Despot, Sanja. 2024. Andrej Plenković nadigrao DP: Program Vlade skraćena je verzija programa HDZ-a. *Faktograf.hr*, 17 May 2024.
- Dimitrijević, Andrej. 2024. Pregled mandata: Kako je izgledalo pet godina predsjednika Zorana Milanovića. *Faktograf.hr*, 27 December 2024.
- Ferenčić, Domagoj. 2024. Selak Raspuđić first official candidate for upcoming presidential elections. *Glas Hrvatske*, 19 October 2024.
- GONG. 2024. Gong o Milanovićevoj kandidaturi: HDZ-ove nepravde ne treba ispravljati udarom na politički sustav. *Gong.hr*, 16 March 2024.
- . 2024. Plenković and the parliamentary majority are endangering liberal democracy and the rule of law in Croatia. *Gong.hr*, 7 February 2024.
- Jochechová, Ketrin. 2024. Croatia set to reelect its 'Donald Trump'. *Politico*, 28 December 2024.
- Jutarnji list. 2024. Plenković poslao Lex AP na izglasavanje u Sabor, objavljeno tko sve može biti odgovoran. *Jutarnji list*, 29 February 2024.
- Kannenberg, Oliver 2024. Croatia moves to the (far-)right. The parliamentary election 2024. *Southeast Europe in Focus* 6(2), 1-9.
- Kukec, Marko. 2020. *Party leaders in Croatia: Comparing Ivo Sanader and Zoran Milanović, in Party leaders in Eastern Europe: Personality, behavior and consequences*, edited by Gherghina, Sergiu. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 67-92.

<sup>18</sup> See, Nikić Čakar, Dario. 2021. *Croatia: Strong prime minister and weak coalitions*, in *Coalition governance in Western Europe*, edited by Bergman, Torbjörn / Bäck, Hanna and Johan Hellström. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 640-679; Nikić Čakar, Dario and Alenka Krašovec. 2021. Coping with the new party challenge: Patterns of prime ministerial survival in Croatia and Slovenia. *East European Politics* 37(4), 417-431.

- Lalić, Dražen and Marijana Grbeša. 2016. The 2014/2015 Croatian presidential election: Tight and far-reaching victory of the political right. *Contemporary Southeastern Europe* 2(1), 45-54.
- N1 info. 2024. Milanović o Draganu Primorcu: "To je Titov pionir i Titov član Saveza komunista. *N1 info*, 26 November 2024.
- Nikić Čakar, Dario. 2021. *Croatia: Strong prime minister and weak coalitions*, in *Coalition governance in Western Europe*, edited by Bergman, Torbjörn / Bäck, Hanna and Johan Hellström. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 640-679.
- Nikić Čakar, Dario and Goran Čular. 2022. Democratic consolidation and electoral system change in Croatia: What is wrong with the proportional representation? *Political Studies Review* 20(4), 546-577.
- Nikić Čakar, Dario and Alenka Krašovec. 2021. Coping with the new party challenge: Patterns of prime ministerial survival in Croatia and Slovenia. *East European Politics* 37(4), 417-431.
- Peović, Katarina. 2020. Croatian presidential elections 2019-2020: The anti-corruption myth. *Contemporary Southeastern Europe* 7(1), 1-10.
- Raos, Višeslav. 2023. Between stale stability and dynamic contestation. *Southeastern Europe* 47(2-3), 238-264.
- State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia. *Arhiva izbora* (accessed: 04 February 2025)
- . Konačni rezultati izbora za predsjednika Republike Hrvatske (accessed: 4 February 2025).
- Szumski, Charles and Georgi Gotev. 2025. Croatian elections cheat sheet. *Euroactive*, 11 January 2025.
- Tesija, Vuk. 2024. Croatian parliament confirms new attorney general despite opposition criticism. *BalkanInsight*, 7 February 2024.
- Wikipedia. 2024 Croatian parliamentary election (accessed: 04 February 2025).
- Youtube. Predsjednički izbori—drugi krug: sučeljavanje (accessed: 18 February 2025).